

GOOGLE PLAY INTEGRITY

(OPENSOURCE ALTERNATIVE)

Securing Android Apps from Abuse

Unified Attestation proposal by Volla Systeme GmbH

What Is Attestation?

Attestation is a process where a system proves its **identity and integrity** to another system using cryptographic evidence.

In Android's context (e.g., SafetyNet or Play Integrity API):

- Attestation is Google's way of confirming that:
 - The **app is legitimate** and untampered.
 - The **device is genuine**, not rooted, not tampered, and is Play-certified.

Key properties of attestation:

- Uses hardware-backed cryptographic keys.
- Binds the attestation to:
 - Device state (bootloader lock)
 - App identity
 - A random nonce
- Returns a **signed Response** from Google.

WHAT IS GOOGLE PLAY INTEGRITY API?

- Part of Google Play services
- Verifies if:
 - The app is genuine and unmodified
 - The device is certified (Play Protect certified)
 - The app was installed from Google Play
- Server-side attestation model using signed responses from Google

ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

Client Side (App):


- Calls the Integrity API via Play Core library
- Receives signed response

Google Play Backend:

- Processes request
- Attests the app, device, installer
- Returns signed JWT payload

Developer Backend:

- Verifies and interprets response securely



Validate Request

- Confirms request came from a Play-distributed, untampered app.
- Uses app signature and installation source.

Perform Device & App Checks

- Evaluates:
 - App authenticity (e.g., PLAY_RECOGNIZED)
 - Device integrity (e.g., MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY)
 - Licensing/account status (optional)

Generate Signed Response

- Signs a **JSON Web Token** with Google's private key.
- Token contains:
 - Nonce + timestamp
 - App info (package name, SHA-256 cert)
 - Verdicts

Send JWT to App

- App can now send this token to the backend for secure verification and decision-making.

**HOW GOOGLE CERTIFIES A NEW
ANDROID DEVICE ?**

Steps in Certifying a New Device:

1. OEM (e.g., Samsung, Xiaomi, etc.) submits the device for certification.

1. Includes firmware image, build fingerprint, and manufacturing info.

2. Google runs automated tests:

1. Compatibility Test Suite (**CTS**)

2. Security Test Suite (**STS**)

3. Google Test Suite (**GTS**)

These ensure the device adheres to Android compatibility standards and security policies.

3. Attestation Key Injection:

1. If certified, Google securely provisions **attestation keys** (for SafetyNet or Play Integrity).

2. These are stored in the device's **Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)**.

3. Only certified factories get access to this provisioning process.

4. Certification Complete:

1. Device is marked **Play Protect certified** in Google's systems.

2. Can now pass MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY or MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY.

UNIFIED ATTESTATION

inspired from **unifiedPush** and **unifiedNLP**

What is UnifiedNLP?

- An **open-source alternative** to Google's proprietary location services (Fused Location Provider).

Key Features:

- Provides **location, geocoding, and activity recognition** without Google Play Services.

Modular backend system:

- Wi-Fi, Cell, GPS backends (e.g., Mozilla Location Service, LocalGSMBackend).

What is UnifiedPush?

- A **decentralized push notification system** designed to replace Google's FCM (Firebase Cloud Messaging).


Key Components:

- **Distributor:** App or service that receives and delivers push messages (e.g., ntfy, Gotify, self-hosted).
- **App:** Registers with UnifiedPush API
- **Push Server:** Sends notifications to the distributor

CHALLENGES


- Ask app **developers** to use this service on app and servers (Google Cloud Console)
- We should implement as **System Service** embedded in firmware (Google play services)
- We want this service to be **Federated** as much as possible (unlike Google play server)
- We have to verify devices security and sanity with **Tests** (Google CTS, STS ...)
- We need trusted **laboratories** to run tests on devices (Google MADA third-party labs)

Application Side:




Android Google play services alternative:


System Service Side:




OEM Side:




FEDERATED SERVER APPROACH




App Server Side:



On App backend server



On Device backend server



API

DEVICE → BACKEND

POST /api/v1/device/process

```
{
  projectId,
  requestHash,
  attestationChain[],
  deviceMeta: {
    manufacturer,
    brand,
    model,
    device,
    buildFingerprint
  }
}
```

APP SERVER → BACKEND

POST /api/v1/app/decodeToken

```
{
  projectId,
  token,
  expectedRequestHash
}
```

OTHER OPENSOURCE PROJECTS

Feature	Unified Attestation	GrapheneOS Auditor	Warden Supreme
Freshness binding	requestHash	QR challenge or time-limited challenge	Nonce challenge
Proof carrier	Signed token (EAT/JWS-like)	Certificate chains	CSR with attestation extension
Backend verify logic	decodeToken (policy + federation)	Server verifies local device data	Backend verifies CSR + issues cert
Client SDK/Service	System service (AIDL)	Auditor app	Client lib + server verifier

OTHER OPENSOURCE PROJECTS

- **GrapheneOS Attestation**
 - Not a Play Integrity–style replacement
 - No OEM device submission or certification ingestion
 - No CTS / lab-certified device registry model
 - No backend-issued integrity tokens for apps
 - No app server–verifiable attestation API
 - No provider discovery or backend selection
 - No federation or enterprise trust model
 - Not designed for commercial app ecosystems
 - No standardized backend policy enforcement
- **Warden Supreme**
 - Server side is a library, not an authoritative backend
 - No global or OEM-submitted verified device registry
 - Cannot pre-trust CTS / lab-certified device fleets
 - No backend identity (issuer) or federation model
 - Challenge/nonce lifecycle must be implemented externally
 - No provider discovery or backend selection logic
 - No unified admin, OEM, or app-dev control plane
 - No ecosystem-level trust continuity across deployments

```
backend-1 | {"level":30,"time":1770646303009,"pid":99,"hostname":"d0a12668af7f","reqId":"req-4g","requestId":"7d4cc3af-c45a-450d-923d-18ed0ed0dc72","chainInfo":[{"index":0,"serial":"01","subject":"CN=Android Keystore Key","issuer":"title=TEE\nserialNumber=05be945217a1cb39cca0fae2f308a088","isSelfSigned":false,"hasAttestationExtension":true}, {"index":1,"serial":"96815F8701403CF1EAF51F4D26C4A37D","subject":"title=TEE\nserialNumber=05be945217a1cb39cca0fae2f308a088","issuer":"title=TEE\nserialNumber=3b7add54f66194b56a73d1e4c6db2f41","isSelfSigned":false,"hasAttestationExtension":false}, {"index":2,"serial":"C9C9CAA3B6F974ED9AF597BAEF698913","subject":"title=TEE\nserialNumber=3b7add54f66194b56a73d1e4c6db2f41","issuer":"serialNumber=f92009e853b6b045","isSelfSigned":false,"hasAttestationExtension":false}, {"index":3,"serial":"F1C172A699EAF51D","subject":"serialNumber=f92009e853b6b045","issuer":"serialNumber=f92009e853b6b045","isSelfSigned":true,"hasAttestationExtension":false}], "msg":"device.process chain summary"}
backend-1 | {"level":40,"time":1770646303022,"pid":99,"hostname":"d0a12668af7f","reqId":"req-4g","requestId":"7d4cc3af-c45a-450d-923d-18ed0ed0dc72","deviceMeta":{"manufacturer":"volla","brand":"volla","model":"Volla Phone Plinius","device":"ansuz","buildFingerprint":"volla/ansuz/ansuz:15/BP1A.250505.005/54-volla-15.0:userdebug/release-keys"},"candidates":[{"id":"cmlf2bn8n0007nh24ta53zr2p","codename":"ansuz","model":"vpp","manufacturer":"Volla","brand":"Volla"}], "msg":"device.process device prefilter mismatch"}
```

Account Management

App Dev ▾

Create User

Username: volla
Role: oem

Disable Delete

Change Password

Username: admin
Role: admin

Disable Delete

Change Password

Settings

Backend ID: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0
Public key: MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA6yQW9IA77h9tq0qF78sGgWTJ95305tCOg9ecwdj9M=

Rotate Signing Key

Backend Root Anchors

Generates the backend RSA + ECDSA roots used to chain OEM and device anchors.

Generate Root

UA Backend Root

RSA: 69C68566BC07CD5978D3E90D70BFB45A
ECDSA: 3E7AD8FD9CE1B04756AFA63BDB959359

Revoke

Remove

Created: 2/9/2026, 5:56:00 PM

Attestation Authorities

Add Authority

google

<https://android.googleapis.com/attestation>

RSA: · ECDSA:

Status cached: 2/9/2026, 5:45:56 PM

Refreshed successfully.

Refresh Roots/Status

Unified Attestation (Local)

<http://a.uattest.net/api/v1/info>

RSA: · ECDSA:

Status cached: never

Refresh Roots/Status

Federation Management

Add Backend

Devices

ansuz
Model: Volla Phone Plinius

Register Device

Save

ansuz

ID: cmlf2bn8n0007nh24ta53zr2p

- Device
- Builds
- Trust Anchors**
- Reports

Trust Anchors

Anchors

Select attestation authority

Register Anchor

Generate Keys

RSA: F1C172A699EAF51D

RSA intermediate: C9C9CAA3B6F974ED9AF597BAEF698913

ECDSA: F1C172A699EAF51D

ECDSA intermediate: C9C9CAA3B6F974ED9AF597BAEF698913

Authority: google

Created: 2/9/2026, 6:02:30 PM

Revoke

Remove

ansuz

ID: cmlf2bn8n0007nh24ta53zr2p

Device

Builds

Trust Anchors

Reports

Build Policies

volla/ansuz/ansuz:15/BP1A.250505.005/54-volla-15.0:userdebug/release-keys

60c6b25322ffaa185693638c21ae377c4f1c6ecbc54741dbc1a7812d79f41c88

60c6b25322ffaa185693638c21ae377c4f1c6ecbc54741dbc1a7812d79f41c88

150000

202602

Enabled

Update Build

volla/ansuz/ansuz:15/BP1A.250505.005/54-volla-15.0:userdebug/release-keys

Boot key: 60c6b25322ffaa18...

OS version: 150000

OS patch level: 202602

Enabled: yes

Edit

Delete

Profile

Save

Change Password

OEM Trust Anchor

Generate OEM RSA + ECDSA intermediate certs chained to the backend root.

Status: active

Generate OEM Trust Anchor

RSA Intermediate

C=DE O=Unified Attestation CN=UA volla OEM RSA Intermediate

Serial: 16987C5F0B0B73A7167641AA1E3FE761

ECDSA Intermediate

C=DE O=Unified Attestation CN=UA volla OEM ECDSA Intermediate

Serial: F7FC66313346120EOA17D981C624EB23

Created: 2/9/2026, 6:02:46 PM

Revoke

Remove

OEM trust anchor generated and downloaded.

Federation (Read-only)

Registered Apps

Example app

Project ID: net.uattest.example
Signer digest: a1e277aa2f65e74d...

Register App

Register

Edit App

Save

Delete

App Server Secret

Rotate Secret

Unified Attestation Example

RequestHash:

dcddf9ccb10df690ca941940830546d2

fe34a140ea37b0230248baef572aafd9

Selected backend: 39bd2564-39bd-71

64-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Token received, verifying...

Verdict: verdict: { isTrusted:

false, reasonCodes:

["BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH"] }

<https://app-a.uattest.net>

Run Attestation

Unified Attestation Service

Sanity OK: eyJ0eXAI0ij1YS5p

Backend URL

Add

Refresh Health

39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

<https://a.uattest.net>

Status: unreachable

DISABLE

REMOVE

SANITY CHECK

Device Reports

Device: 5fe0ad3306f608aa...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:51:22.693Z

Verdict: rejected

Device: 99e0cfede1bd9421...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:49:15.982Z

Verdict: trusted

Device: d0db56af5f068802...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:47:46.239Z

Verdict: rejected

Device: 1d00336e9acfc3e1...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:46:21.778Z

Verdict: rejected

Device: a76c7bf4faf60f11...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:45:31.720Z

Verdict: rejected

Device: 1168e524cf8266af...

Issuer: 39bd2564-39bd-7164-8514-f8ba2194efc0

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:38:24.566Z

Verdict: rejected

ansuz

ID: cmlf2bn8n0007nh24ta53zr2p

Device

Builds

Trust Anchors

Reports

Failing Devices

Device: 906b145c9247fa5c...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:55:12.908Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

Device: 5fe0ad3306f608aa...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:51:22.693Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

Device: d0db56af5f068802...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:47:46.239Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

Device: 1d00336e9acfc3e1...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:46:21.778Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

Device: a76c7bf4faf60f11...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:45:31.720Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

Device: 1168e524cf8266af...

Last seen: 2026-02-09T14:38:24.566Z

Build fingerprint: unmatched

Reasons: BUILD_POLICY_MISMATCH

TODO

- More testing
- General UI/UX fixes
- Federation Tests
- Better Docs
- Implementing RKP server
- Validate Origin of the installed package

SUMMARY

- **Open Source:** Transparent, vendor-independent attestation framework to verify app integrity and device trust. **without relying on Google services.**
- **App Integrity:** Ensure the app is untampered using digital signatures or checksums.
- **Device Integrity:** Detect rooted/emulated/unofficial devices using secure.
- **Signed Attestation:** Generate and verify tamper-proof attestation tokens using **public/private key pairs.**
- **Server-Side Validation:** Provide a backend API for securely checking client claims, nonces, and timestamps.
- **Operating System Independent:** This service is not android only and can be implemented on Ubuntu Touch or other Mobile OS

REFERENCES

- <https://github.com/microg/UnifiedNlp>
- <https://unifiedpush.org/>
- <https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity>

UATTEST

- <https://uattest.net/>
- <https://github.com/unifiedattestation/>